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Brazil

Overall Economic Planning in Brazil
by Frieder Meyer-Krahmer, Hagen * In Brazil economic policy planning, with its beginning in the early fifties, has been undertaken for a relatively long period already. Just this fact makes it possible to analyse development, contents, significance, limitations, and chances of this planning and its realisation over a prolonged period.
F
or an analysis of Brazil's planning programmes and their realisation it is necessary to deal with the institutional prerequisites, the contents of the economic policy plans and their realisation mainly against the background of their limitations.
Today's most important planning institutions 1 are the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance. The Planning Ministry's tasks are mainly to be found in the field of global planning and coordination of sectoral planning which is mostly, and under their own responsibility, formulated and implemented by the competent ministries, the Ministries for Agriculture, Transport and Communications, Education, Labour and Social Order, Industries and Energy Supply. The Finance Ministry's task is the financial securing of planning programmes and the working-out of the national budget. Besides there are economic institutes as e.g. the Fundacao Getulio Vargas and banks, particularly the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDE) and the Banco do Brasil which are involved in the setting up of plans and individual projects and the current plan supervision.
Two other important institutions acting mainly at the stage of plan implementation are a Federal Audit Office and an interministerial Commission for Price Formation (CIP). This Commission does not only have the task of controlling prices but is also to examine thoroughly the calculation of costs in the industrial sectors involved and to base its price policy on these examinations 2. This Commission is existing since the seizure of power by the military in 1964. At first the price control was implemented generally only, but in the mean- time has been passed over to a detailed sectoral control. Finally there are also regional planning institutions, e.g. SUDENE for the north east of the country and planning departments of the 22 federal states and individual cities (e.g. Sao Paulo)3
The planning competences on the federal level are distributed to the competent ministries because of their responsibility. With that the Ministry of Planning is on the same level as the other competent ministries and has not the authority to give directives. This has, as will be shown later, seriously impeding effects on global planning due to the missing compulsion to coordinate sectoral planning. In addition it has become evident that with that the effectiveness of the Planning Ministry's activities considerably depends on the political importance and authority of the minister in charge.
Important in this context is also that Article 170 of the constitution stipulates that the principle of the economic order should be the consideration of private initiative as the main factor of economic development --i.e. planning must therefore on principle be direction-planning through the operation of free market forces.
Planning Process
The planning process shapes up in such a manner that the setting up and publication of plans is mostly undertaken at two stages: At the first stage a general skeleton plan is set up in which the most important targets, the most important structural measures and the most important macroeconomic and sectoral data are determined provisionally. This general skeleton plan is being published together with the planning government's reasons for its economic policy in the form of a paper of 50-100 pages.
B R A Z I L At the second directly following stage the skeleton plan, which is usually enacted as a decree with the force of law by the President, will be replaced by a very comprehensive and very detailed implementation plan. With that only at this stage the actual "programming of planning ''4 takes place.
The implementation of the stipulations of the plan and their control takes place mostly under the supervision of the Ministries of Planning, of Finance and the competent ministries. In Brazil it is however usual to conceive for major regional or sectoral projects an institution responsible for them. Most widely known are SUDENE, SUDAM, RADAM, INCRA, and PROVALE. It is the only task of these institutions to look after their project, to prepare its implementation, to introduce the corresponding measures, to control continuously the project with regard to its objective and possibly to initiate changes in the planning programme.
Contents and Methods of Global Planning
Apart from two attempted planning programmes during World War II 5, the "Piano SALTE" [ ] Realisation of fundamental reforms, i.e. of administration, banks, finance, and agriculture.
[ ] Reduction of foreign debts which increased strongly because of permanent balance of payments deficits.
With that the plan had the comparatively ambitious objective of realizing simultaneously growth, stability and fundamental reforms. The basic idea in this connection was that these three partial objectives are closely interconnected and cannot be obtafned individually, in particular since in the medium and the long term no growth worth mentioning could be realised without fundamental structural reforms (Theory of Stagnation of C. Furtado 7).
The following first plan of the new military regime under Castello Branco, the "Piano de Acao Economica do Governo" (PAEG: Plan of Government Economic Activities) 1964-1966, had a striking similarity to the Piano Trienal, although the politically objectionable structural reforms no longer existed in this plan and it put even more emphasis on the struggle against inflation. The following global objectives were set up: [ ] Equilibrium in the balance of payments through the development of a system of export production incentives.
Primarily these targets are to be obtained through monetary measures, particularly by balancing future budgetary deficits not by an increase of the money supply any more, but by government bonds; secondly in that temporarily the expansion of the credit volume should increase at most at the same rate as the GDP at current prices does; and thirdly in that the increase of the minimum wages as fixed by the government, which influence considerably the entire domestic wage level, should at most correspond to the rate of inflation (i.e. in real terms stagnating or decreasing minimum wages).
These three planned fields of government action offered, mainly for the struggle against inflation, effective approaches and represented also a much more consequent concept than the partially contradictory list of aims of the Piano Trienal, but offered less chances for obtaining the GDP growth BRAZIL rate target of 6 p.c. Thus the struggle against inflation became plainly the most important component of the target. Detailed measures were planned for the settlement of the balance of payments through the promotion of foreign tradeas e.g. a number of tax incentives for exports, the simplification of the exchange of currencies, realistic (i.e. lower) exchange rates and a revision of the highly restrictive Capital-Transfer-ControlLaw 8 of 1963 in order to regain the foreign capital that to a large extent had flown off during the preceding years.
After a relatively successfu~ reduction of the inflation rate, in the following plan under Costa e Silva, the "Piano Estrategico de Desenvolvimento" (PED: Strategic Development Plan)9 for 1968 to 1970, the emphasis shifted from the stability to the growth target. The global objectives aimed at were:
[] A GDP growth rate of at least 6 p.c. annually for the period from 1968-1970, which had not been reached so far.
[] A further check of the inflationary development.
[] A higher growth of employment from hitherto 2.7 p.c. to 3.3 p.c. (1970), mainly through a diversification of industrial production and large infrastructural investments.
[] Reduction of the public authorities' share in the GDP and in the overall economic investments, which had grown rapidly in the meantime, because of the relative inefficiency of this sector.
But the focal point of the plan is, owing to the importance of the growth target, sectoral planning because in the sense of the unbalanced growth in the infrastructural and industrial sector, similar to the Kubitschek-plan, typical growth industries and economic bottleneck sectors were chosen as the actual supporters ("Aereas Estrategicas"). The concept in the background is the attempt to reach a balanced growth path at a higher level by an unbalanced growth.
On the level of global planning however the plan contained two seriously conflicting targets owing to its aimed at check of inflation -increase of growth, and the reduction of the state's share in GDP as well as the extensive public investment programme.
The following plan under Emilio G. Medici, the "Primeiro Piano Nacional de Desenvolvimento" This plan exceeds in the sense of a comprehensive planning all these objectives --which essentially are a continuation of the aims of all the plans with global planning and differ mainly by shifts in their focal points only -by undertaking the planning of the regional equalisation 12 and a considerable extension of the sectoral planning, in particular of education, health and social planning. This reflects ma'inly the state's extended scope of action, which since 1968/70 finds its expression through the end of the recession continuing since 1962, high GDP growth rates and large government revenue.
After an analysis of the method of economic planning, particularly the implied economic system, the system of sectoral, regional and bottleneck planning, and the applied equation systems, one can summarize 13.
The macro-economic equation system which has been developed for the first time in ,,Piano Decehal Desenvolvimento Economico e Social" (1967 to 1976) is a methodical focal point. Apart from the fact that it cannot simultaneously be solved completely 14, it represents -if considering particularly the production, investment and price 11 According to official information this is the minimum rate of increase in exports in order to be able to cover the planned expenditure on imports of machinery; cf. Deutsche Oberseeische Bank, monthly reports, November 1972, p. 20; cf. also C. D o e Il i n g e r, Transformacao da Estrutura das Exportacoes Bresileiras (IPEA), Rio de Janeiro 1973; M. T a v a r e s, ba Substituicao de Importacoes ao Capitalismo Financeiro, 2. edition, Rio BRAZIL level functions --only a simple and undifferentiated equation system with all the resulting negative effects on the realization chances of such a macro-or global planning. Moreover, planningmethodical criteria such as completeness, consistency, compatibility, and flexibility are in most of the plans only partially met.
Limits to the Relization of Macro-economic Planning
This final part is devoted to an analysis of the realization of global planning in Brazil with regard to 'its limitations, since the latter are particularly crucial for global planning.
In addition to the afore-mentioned restrictions to the realization, of the planning due to methodicaltheoretical deficiencies, there are numerous competence struggles, mainly between the Central Government and the individual federal states, which also affect the global planning. An obvious example for this is the realization of the "Piano de Metas" 15. At that time the federal states had a strong autonomous position vis-a-vis the Central Government; besides, the coordination of the individual bodies which were entrusted with the plan realization was insignificant 16. This federative cleavage of the administration, which hampered a consistent and quick plan re.alization, was after a transitory phase partially abolished by the military government in 1967; in 1969 it was tightened in. this direction by another change of the constitution. The narrow sphere of competency of the Planning Ministry, however continued to exist.
A further limitation of plan realization can be shown if using the PAEG (1964) (1965) (1966) as an example. In the PAEG-period the inflation rate could -relative to the disastrous initial situationbe lowered substantially, confidence abroad could be restored, and the balance of payments could be brought back to equilibrium. The GDP grew at real rates of only 2.9 p.c. It is important to note that a number of these measures -particularly short-term and partially medium-term ones -were not contained in the plan. Thus economic planning -and this concerns the whole range of Brazilian economic planning -was often restricted to the following activities: enunciation of global and sectoral targets, their systematic coordination on the basis of an economic development concept, and determination of the most essential measures or only fields of measures. Numerous medium and particularly short-term market control measures were not included in the plans and were -due to the statical management of the plan -not introduced into them subsequently. A further important restriction was imposed by the far-reaching lack of information material for a control of the plan realization. Taken as a whole, the government's plan evaluations are insufficient, particularly outside of the industrial sector 19
To sum up, it can be stated empirically that the global planning in Brazil is insufficient and suffers from large margins of error; this is shown by the numerous miscastings. The analysis delivered the following reasons for this: undifferentiated methodical-theoretical foundations, lacking flexibility and adjustment of the plans to changing overall economic conditions, insufficient information material for the evaluation, the restrictions on the planning ministry -institutionally and with regard to its competences -, and the fact that the importance of the Planning Ministry has even further declined for the plan period of the PND (1972) (1973) (1974) due to the polit'ical weight and the ability of the Finance Minister to carry his point 2~ An. additional analysis of the sectoral planning 21 confirms these results, since it becomes obvious that the global planning in Brazil, in spite of the relatively large expenses involved, holds only a secondary rank compared with the sectoral planning. This is valid with regard to its importance, efficiency, and successful realization.
